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creditor, who can wait and attach the funds in the hands of the
cestui. But in a forum which favors the rights of the creditor
above the desire of the settlor to restrict alienation, and which
accordingly wishes to give the creditor a lien on the funds before
they reach the cestui, it would be well to supplement the remedy
provided by Pole v. Pietsch with that of Hamilton v. Drago.
Where these remedies thus are used in conjunction the creditor
will be protected in both contingencies :-under the "split sec-
ond" rule he can attach the sum about to be paid over, and, under
the doctrine of Pole v. Pietsch, in the event that the trustee
should fail properly to exercise his discretion, he can go to court
to force reasonable payments to satisfy his claim.
These are not perfect solvents of the problem. Taking into
account the complex and often diametrically conflicting factors
of the settlor's intent, the public policy of the jurisdiction, the
discretion of the trustee, the claim of the cestui to present sup-
port and the claim of the creditor for a debt perhaps incurred
long before the creation of the trust, these two remedies, even
though used in conjunction, appear woefully incomplete. More
subtle and adequate methods may in time be devised. Meanwhile
these tools, however blunt, have been fashioned by the courts
and lie at hand; much can be done with these to extricate the
creditor from his present unsatisfactory position.
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER '35.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE PROVISIONS
UNDER THE NIRA
With the enactment of the NIRA there arose a great deal of
speculation as to how effective its provisions would be and the
extent to which the courts would enforce them. The purpose of
the Act as stated in the Declaration of Policy is to eliminate un-
fair competitive practices, reduce and relieve unemployment, im-
prove the standards of labor, and otherwise rehabilitate indus-
try.1 According to Senator Wagner the National Industrial Re-
covery Act has as its single objective the wide-spread and perma-
nent reemployment of workers at wages sufficient to secure com-
fort and decent living. Business may not compete by reducing
wages, by sweating labor, or by resorting to unfair practices.2
The purpose of this discussion is to show the extent to which the
courts have enforced minimum wage provisions under the NIRA.
The NIRA itself provides for several methods of enforcing the
'48 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 701.
'Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance, May 22 to June 1, 1933,
p. 1 .
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various codes of fair competition. 3 Section 3 (b) declares that
any violation of the standards set up in an approved code shall
be deemed an unfair method of competition in commerce within
the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and gives the
Federal Trade Commission power to proceed against such viola-
tion.4  Section 3 (c) invests the district courts of the United
States with jurisdiction to restrain violations of any code and
makes it the duty of the United States district attorneys to in-
stitute proceedings in equity to restrain such violations. In
addition to injunctive proceedings the offender may be subjected
to criminal proceedings and fined under section 3 (f) which
makes such violation a misdemeanor."
These methods of enforcing compliance with the codes are the
only ones expressly provided for in the NIRA. No provision is
made for a civil action against an employer by a private indi-
vidual. Nevertheless the courts have generally recognized the
right of an employee to bring a civil action against his employer
to recover the difference between the wages received and the
minimum wage standard for the industry. In considering the
basis upon which the courts have allowed recovery in these cases
a distinction must be made between suits brought under the
President's Reemployment Agreement 7 and suits brought under
the several codes of fair competition.
Where the employee has brought his suit for minimum wages
under the PRA or blanket coke it has been held that the PRA
.constituted a contract between the President and the employer
for the benefit of the employee. 8 In such a case recovery has
' For a discussion of this subject see, Ralph F. Fuchs, "The Constitution-
ality of the Recovery Program," (1933) 19 St. Louis Law Rev. 1.
148 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 703 (b).
48 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 703 (c).
'48 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 703 (f). The NIRA also vested the
President with authority to enforce the code in any industry which is acting
contrary to the policy of the code by declaring that it is essential to licbnse
business enterprise in order to make effective a code of fair competition
and by refusing to issue such license or revoking it unless the terms and
conditions of the code are carried out. 48 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec.
704 (b). However this power was never used and has now expired.
The President's Reemployment Agreement or Blanket code as it is some-
times called was sent to every employer with a request that he sign, by
President Roosevelt on July 27, 1933, as part of a nation wide plan to raise
wages, create employment and thus increase purchasing power and restore
business. The agreement related to hours of employment, wages, employ-
ment of minors, and patronage of establishments which had signed it and
were listed as members of the N. R. A.
I The following cases have upheld the employee's right to recover back
wages in a civil action against his employer under the PRA. Beaton v.
Avondale (Oct. 1933) Dist. Ct. Denver, Colo., I Prentice Hall "Trade and
Commerce" Sec. 8017; Mesloh v. Schulte, (May 1934) Mun. Ct., City of
Borough of Queens, 273 N. Y. S. 699; Hovens v. Peterson, Mun. Ct., Iowa(Dec. 1933), Vol. 2, NO. 5 U. S. Law Week p. 23; Johnson v. Ben Shrago
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been allowed under the third-party-beneficiary theory as set forth
in Lawrence v. Fox.9 Objection has been made to this theory
on the ground that a third party is entitled to recover on a con-
tract only if the consideration upon which the right is claimed
was furnished by the promisee with the intent that it secure such
benefit to the third party, and that no intent on the part of the
promisee, the President, to give him a right of action clearly
appears.10 But it may be argued to the contrary that the agree-
ment was intended to benefit the employee since the main pur-
pose of the NIRA was to improve conditions of labor and put
people back to work. Also it has been denied that the employer
received sufficient consideration for his promise to make the
PRA a valid contract. The answer which the courts have made
to this argument is that there is sufficient consideration to the
employer in the agreement to eliminate unfair competitive prac-
tices, increase purchasing power, raise prices and in the authority
conferred to display the Blue Eagle.". The right of the employee
to take advantage of the contract as one made for his benefit
receives support in the case of collective labor agreements where
a somewhat similar situation is involved. Where an agreement
between the employer and the labor union is recognized as a valid
contract a member of the union is allowed, in several jurisdic-
tions, to bring suit under such agreement as one for whose bene-
fit it was made.12
and Sons, (June 1934) City Ct., Hammond, Ind., Vol. 2 No. 5 U. S. Law
Week p. 24; Taylor v. Joe 0. Frank Co., (June 1934) Mun. Ct., Dayton,
Ohio, Vol. 2 No. 5 U. S. Law Week p. 24; Morrison v. Gentler, (Sept. 1934)
Mun. Ct., Brooklyn, 273 N. Y. S. 922; Saranita v. Imbrosciano, (June 1934)
Mun. Ct., Cleveland, Ohio, Vol 2, No. 5 U. S. Law Week p. 24; Fuldi v.
Wysocki (June 1934) City Ct. East St. Louis, Ill; Tedford v. Taylor (Jan.
1934) J. P., Kansas City, Mo.; Bethel v. Karras (Nov. 1933) Common
Pleas Ct., Detroit, Mich.; Rush v. Somers (Nov. 1933) Common Pleas Ct.,
Detroit, Mich.; Chipa v. Regas (Nov. 1933) J. P. Tucson, Ariz.
(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
'*See note in 33 Col. Law Rev. 394, "Some Problems in the Application of
Contract Doctrine to Recovery Agreements and Codes." (1933).
" The PRA does not expressly make such promises but the courts have
implied them. See cases cited in f. n. 8 supra. In Petruska v. Farina,
(June 1934) County Ct., Allegheny Co., Pa. the employer was estopped to
deny the applicability and efficacy of the PRA by displaying the Blue Eagle.
(2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 24); Nagel v. Mader (May 1934) Mun. Ct.,
Mitchell, S. D. held that the display of the Blue Eagle was sufficient con-
sideration. 2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 24.
"The third-part-beneficiary theory has not been widely adopted and has
been criticized by William Gorham Rice, Jr., "Collective Labor Agreements
in American Law" 44 Harvard Law Rev. 572. For support of the theory
see, "Theories of Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements," 41 Yale
Law Journal 1221, and the following cases: Blum and Co. v. Landau, 23
Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926); Johnson v. Amer. Ry. Express Co.
(1931) 163 S. C. 191, 161 S. E. 573; Gulla v. Barton (1924) 164 App. Div.
293, 149 N. Y. S. 952; Yazoo and M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, (1931) 161
Miss. 4, 133 So. 669.
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From the cases which have been decided to date it appears
that only one court has refused to allow an employee to sue to
recover the wages which the employer promised to pay when he
signed the PRA.13 The Tennessee district court held that the
remedies provided for by the Recovery Act itself are exclusive
and that neither state nor federal courts have jurisdiction of
such a suit. However, there is nothing in the NIRA which de-
clares that violators can be proceeded against only by the methods
expressly provided therein. If the PRA is recognized as a con-
tract there should be no difficulty in recognizing the jurisdiction
of the state court where the cause of action arises out of its
breach.14 The court also declares that where the employee did
not complain at the time he received his wages he cannot later
sue under the PRA. But in those cases allowing recovery it has
been pointed out that acceptance of less wages than the PRA
scale does not constitute a waiver by the employee of his right
to receive the minimum wage.Y
Where the employee brings his suit for wages under a code of
fair competition a somewhat different situation exists. A code,
unlike the President's Reemployment Agreement, does not pur-
port to create a contractual relationship. As stated in one case,
"The code, when approved by the President, becomes the law
of the industry and is binding upon all those engaged in that
industry, whether or not they participate in its formation or
formally assented to its adoption. Its provisions are summarily
imposed upon the members of a particular industry; as any
statute passed by a Legislature affects all of the population."'1
In the case cited the court denied the employee the right to bring
suit against his employer for wages according to the Code of
Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry on the
theory that he was a beneficiary of a contract, and stated that
such claim should be made to the code authority.
This case stands alone however; and other cases allow an
employee to bring a civil suit to recover back wages due under
a code. In Lux v. Smit 7 a filling station operator who refused
to sign the Petroleum Code, but who displayed the Blue Eagle
and accepted the benefits therefrom was held bound by the terms
cCormack v. Betty Lou Bakeries, (Oct. 1934) Tenn. Cir. Ct., County
of Davidson, 2 U. S. Law Week No. 12 p. 8; James Jacob v. Betty Lou
Bakeries (Oct. 1934) Cir. Ct., Co. of Davidson, Tenn. 1 Prentice Hall,
"Trade and Commerce" 8489.
'" See 33 Col. Law Rev. 394, supra, for criticism of the theory that the
PRA is a valid contract for the reasons that there is no promise by the
President and that the element of duress may be found.
"DeVries v. Mid-West Walkathon Ass'n, Inc. et. al., (May 1934) Mun.
Ct., Black Hawk Co., Iowa. 2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 23.
' Abramovitz v. Trolman (July 1934) 273 N. Y. S. 243.
"Mun. Ct. of Marion Co., Indianapolis, Ind. (June 1934). 1 Prentice
Hall, "Trade and Commerce" 8250.
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of the code and estopped to deny liability thereon. Similarly in
Grelech v. Amsterdam an employee was allowed to recover mini-
mum wages although the employer had not signed the Modified
Restaurant Act. 8 In those cases the employers had not consented
to be bound by the code so that there is no basis for holding that
they are liable on a contract unless consent can be implied from
the display of the Blue Eagle. But express refusal to sign seems
to negative any theory of implied assent. In Canton v. The
Palms, Inc.' an employee was awarded wages according to the
minimum rates prescribed by the Restaurant Industry Basic
Code. Here the employer had signed the code and the court
based its decision on the theory that the Code was a contract
for the benefit of third persons and that an employee could sue
as the beneficiary of such a contract. These cases evidently over-
look the compulsory character of the codes.
Although the opinion in the case of Abramowitz v. TrolmanO'
is right in saying that a statutory duty rather than a contractual
relationship is raised by the codes, it does not necessarily follow
that an employee has no right to bring a civil action. The action
may be allowed on the theory that where a statutory duty is im-
posed upon one for the direct benefit or protection of another and
the latter is damaged because this duty is not performed a cause
of action arises in his favor based upon the statute.2 0 An analogy
may also be made to those cases which give to one who is injured
through the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance a civil
action against the wrongdoer for damages. 21 The decisions un-
der the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Adamson Eight-
Hour Law are more in point. These federal acts impose certain
duties upon the employer but do not expressly give to an em-
ployee the right to sue his employer for failing to comply with
these provisions. Nevertheless the decisions have recognized and
supported such right.22
" Mun. Ct., Philadelphia, Pa., (Jan. 1934). 1 Prentice Hall, "Trade and
Commerce" 8156.
City Ct. of Buffalo (July 1934) 273 N. Y. S. 239.
Supra note 16.2 Amberg v. Kinley (1915) 214 N. Y. 531, 108 N. E. 239; Strong v.
American Fence Constr. Co. (1927) 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92. Cases
where suit is brought on a contractor's bond are closely related to the cases
under discussion. In Mankin v. U. S. (1910) 215 U. S. 533, 30 S. C. T. 174
a bond given by a contractor to make payments to persons supplying him
with labor was held to inure to the protection of laborers and materialmen
employed by subcontractors so that they could sue on the bond.
" See discussion in 27 Harvard Law Rev. 317, "Public Wrong and Private
Action," Ezra Ripleu Thayer.
" The relation of the decisions under these acts to the present situation
are discussed in an article by Thomas C. Billing, J. A. Fridinger, and
Philip F. Herrick, "The Worker's Day in Court; Employee's Right to Code
Wages," 3 George Washington Law Rev. 1. (1934)
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In addition to actions at law to recover wages due, proceedings
have been brought in equity to restrain violation of the codes.
In the case of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simples
Shoe Manufacturing Co. the employees sought to enjoin viola-
tion of the PRA. The Wisconsin court, in granting the injunc-
tion, held that the employees were beneficiaries under a contract
and could therefore enjoin its violation.2 3 Where labor unions
have sought to enjoin violation of the provisions of a code of
fair competition rather than of the PRA the cases hold that a
private citizen may not sue to restrain such violation and that
the complaint should be brought by the United States acting
through its district attorney.24 Likewise, the right of a competing
employer to bring such a suit has been denied.2 In Sherman v.
Ables the New York court granted a demand for an injunction
brought by the Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union
against the employers' association to restrain violation of the
Moving Picture Industry Code. 26 But this case was based on an
express statute which invested the Supreme Court of New York
with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of any code
of fair competition at the instance of any party whose interests
are or may be adversely affected by such violation.
At the present time only two of the methods set out in the
NIRA to enforce the codes have been used to any extent. Fines
have been imposed where proceedings have been instituted by
the federal district attorney and in many of these cases the em-
ployer has been ordered to restore back wages.2 7  The federal
courts have also issued injunctions upon complaint of the federal
district attorney.2 8 The right to bring such proceedings cannot
' (Oct. 13, 1933) C. C. Wisconsin, Milwaukee Co., 1 Prentice Hall "Trade
and Commerce" 8004.
Staley v. Peabody Coal Co. (Dec. 1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 612.
"Western Powder Mfg. Co. v. Interstate Coal Co. (Jan. 1934) 2 F. Supp.
619; Purvis v. Bazemeor (Dec. 1933) U. S. Dist. C. S. D. Fla. 1 Prentice
Hall, "Trade & Commerce" 8008.(Jan. 1934) Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co. 1 Prentice Hall, "Trade and Com-
merce" Sec. 8010. An injunction was also granted on the same set of facts
in Brodsky v. Sharbu Operating Co., Inc., (Feb. 1934) Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1
Prentice Hall, "Trade and Commerce" 8105.
U. S. v. Sley System Garages et al., D. C. E. D. Pa. (June 1934) 2
U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 23; U. S. v. Mascott (June 1934) D. C. D. Maine,
2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 23; U. S. v. Clyde Mills, Inc. (June 1934)
D. C. D. R. I., 2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 23; U. S. v. Katz (June 1934)
D. C. Maine, 2 U. S. Law Week No. 5 p. 23; U. S. v. Perfect Coat and
Suit Co. (May 1934) U. S. D. C. N. J., 1 Prentice Hall 8181; U S. v.
Sanderowitz et al., D. C. E. D. Pa. (Oct. 1934) 2 U. S. Law Week No. 12
p. 3.
"U. S. v. Liss et al. (Sept. 1934) D. C. E. D. Pa. 2 U. S. Law Week
No. 8 p. 3; U. S. v. Loma Dress Co. (Sept. 1934) D. C. S. D. N. Y., 2 U. S.
Law Week No. 8 p. 3; U. S. v. Wifam et. al. (Sept. 1934) D. C. E. D. Pa.
2 U. S. Law Week No. 8, p. 3; U. S. v. Sereni (Oct. 1934) D. C. E. D. Pa.
2 U. S. Law Week No. 12 p. 3; U. S. v. Perloff et. al. (Oct. 1934) D. C.
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be questioned since they are expressly authorized by statute.
The few cases which have denied relief have done so on the
ground that the NIRA itself is unconstitutional.29 However most
of the courts have either assumed or expressly upheld the con-
stitutionality of the NIRA and have not only given effect to its
express provisions but have also recognized an implied right in
the employee to enforce its minimum wage provision by a civil
action.
EVELYN HONIGBERG '35.
E. D. Pa. 2 U. S. Law Week No. 12 p. 3; U. S. v. Sharp Motor Co. (Oct.
1934) D. C. M. D. Tenn., 2 U. S. Law Week No. 12 p. 3; U. S. v. French
(Sept. 1934) D. C. W. D., Mich., 2 U. S. Law Week No. 8 p. 3.
" In Anderson, Pros. Att'y v. Killen (Oct. 1934) Cir. Ct., McDowell Co.,
1 Prentice Hall, "Trade and Commerce" 8423, the court denied an injunc-
tion to restrain wage and hour violations of the Lumber and Timber
Products Code on the ground that they are unconstitutional because they
violate the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. The
right of an employer and employee to obtain from each other the best terms
they can as the result of private bargaining was held to be a property right
protected by the due process clause; U. S. v. Juvenile Mfg. Co. (Oct. 1934)
D. C. W. D., Texas, 2 U. S. Law Week No. 12, p. 3 held the NIRA and
the Children's and Infants' Wear Code unconstitutional because they were
designed not to regulate interstate commerce but rather to regulate industry
in each state; U. S. v. Belcher (Oct. 1934) D. C. N. D. Ala., 2 U. S. Law
Week No. 12, p. 3.
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